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Executive summary
The European Union created the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) in 2007 
to co-fund, together with EU member states, policies to help workers negatively affected by 
globalisation find new jobs.
The EGF was a political acknowledgment that the EU, which has exclusive competence over 
trade policy, needed to assume some budgetary responsibility for the economic displacement 
arising from globalisation.
This policy contribution attempts to evaluate the EGF programme after ten years of 
implementation and in the context of the negotiations on the EU’s 2021-27 Multiannual 
Financial Framework.
The EGF programme is relatively modest in size. During the decade from 2007 to 2016, it 
financed 147 cases (involving either large firms or regionally-concentrated groups of small 
firms), covering 140,000 dismissed workers. But only about half of the cases and job losses 
were related to globalisation. The other half were related to the economic and financial crisis, 
which became eligible for EGF assistance in 2009.
Our evaluation addresses both the political visibility of the EGF programme and 
its economic effectiveness, and concentrates on cases and dismissed workers related to 
globalisation.
We find the programme was highly politically visible in the sense that EGF beneficiaries 
tended to work for large firms prior to their redundancies and these job losses were widely 
reported in the media.
The economic effectiveness of the EGF programme is more difficult to evaluate, mainly 
because the available data is insufficient. Estimates, however, suggest that only a small 
proportion of EU workers who lost their jobs because of globalisation received EGF financing. 
Unfortunately it is impossible at this time to assess whether workers who received EGF 
assistance did better in their job searches than those who did not receive EGF assistance.     
We make three main recommendations to improve the EGF programme: 1) collect more 
and better data on EGF cases and assisted workers to enable a proper evaluation of the 
programme; 2) revise the eligibility criteria to qualify for EGF assistance and the co-funding 
rate for the contribution from low-income countries or regions; and 3) enlarge the scope of 
the EGF programme beyond globalisation to also assist workers displaced by intra-EU trade 
and offshoring that result from the working of the single market, which like international 
trade is also an exclusive competence of the EU.
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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom in economics is that trade benefits countries through lower prices, 
greater product variety, better resource allocation and fuller exploitation of scale economies. 
All countries gain from trade, though some might gain more than others. Within countries, 
however, while most individuals stand to gain from trade, some might lose out, typically 
workers whose jobs are displaced by trade liberalisation.  
It was the recognition that trade liberalisation, though good for the country, might hurt 
some workers, which led the United States Congress to establish the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance (TAA) programme under the 1962 Trade Act authorising the US to participate 
in the Kennedy Round (1964-67) of multilateral trade negotiations. Initially meant to pro-
vide income support to workers losing their jobs because of trade negotiations, the TAA 
programme was amended by the 1974 Trade Act to aid workers certified by their local state 
labour department as having been negatively affected by increased imports. The programme 
has remained in effect ever since. Although its economic effectiveness has been questioned, 
there is broad agreement that the TAA programme has played an important political role in 
obtaining the consent of Congress for trade liberalisation1.  
For a long time, no such programme existed at European Union level for the simple 
reason that EU member states typically have much more generous welfare states than the US 
and are therefore better able to cope with the ‘pains from trade’. What has long existed at EU 
level, however, is the European Social Fund (ESF), an instrument of the EU budget with a role 
assigned by the EU Treaty “to render the employment of workers easier and to increase their 
geographical and occupational mobility within the Union, and to facilitate their adaptation 
to industrial changes and to changes in production systems, in particular through vocational 
training and retraining.”
However, unlike to the TAA programme, the ESF was not targeted specifically at workers 
affected by increased imports. Nor does it help equally workers across the entire territory of 
the Union. Instead it was designed to deal with industrial changes in general and to assist 
mainly workers in relatively low-income regions.
With the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF), established in 2006 and oper-
ational since January 2007, the EU now has an instrument broadly comparable to the TAA 
programme. The EGF provides financial assistance to facilitate the re-integration into employ-
ment of workers who have lost their jobs as a result of globalisation – defined as a substantial 
increase in imports into the EU, a serious shift in EU trade in goods or services, a rapid decline 
of the EU’s market share in a given sector, or the offshoring of activities to non-EU coun-
tries– provided these redundancies have a significant adverse impact on the local, regional or 
national economy, regardless of whether they occur in high- or low-income regions. 
The creation of the EGF was a response to the rapid increase in globalisation and was a 
political acknowledgment that the EU, which has exclusive competence over trade policy, 
needs to assume some budgetary responsibility for the economic displacement that glo-
balisation entails. Since the ESF only amounts to a tiny fraction of social expenditures by EU 
member states, it was recognised from the start that the EGF could assume only a relatively 
modest budgetary responsibility and that it needed, therefore, to be both politically visible 
and economically sensible.     
The EGF programme originally ran for the entire duration of the 2007-13 Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF), the seven-year programming cycle of the EU budget. It was 
renewed in 2013 for the duration of the 2014-20 MFF. The financing for the EGF, currently 
capped at €150 million per year, comes from unused ESF money, of which it represents a tiny 
fraction. To give an order of magnitude, the ESF budget for 2014-20 is €84 billion, or €12 bil-
lion per year and close to 10 percent of the entire EU budget. The amount currently permitted 
1  See, for example, Guth and Lee (2017) or D’Amico and Schochet (2012).
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for the EGF represents therefore a little over 1 percent of the ESF budget or 0.1 percent of the 
total EU budget.
We evaluate the EGF programme after ten years of activity and in the context of the negoti-
ations on the 2021-27 MFF (which are expected to start in spring of 2018 with the publication 
by the European Commission in May of detailed proposals). We describe the programme 
(section 2), outline its functioning since its creation until 2016 (section 3), evaluate its political 
visibility and economic effectiveness (section 4) and make recommendations on how it can 
be improved (section 5). 
2 The EGF: aims and procedures
The EGF programme has changed substantially since its introduction in January 2007. The 
original legislation, dating from 2006, has been revised twice: in 2009, during the global finan-
cial crisis, and in 2013, during the negotiations for the 2014-20 MFF.
The EGF’s original objective was to co-finance – together with national authorities in 
charge of implementing programmes at the local level – policies to facilitate the re-integration 
into employment of workers made redundant as a result of globalisation. The co-funding rate 
has changed several times since the creation of the Fund. The EGF share was 50 percent in 
2007 and 2008, 65 percent during the crisis from 2009 to 2011, 50 percent again in 2012 and 
2013 and 60 percent since 2014. 
Given their contingent nature, there is no precise commitment for EGF expenditures in 
the Multiannual Financial Framework. The MFF only defines an annual cap for EGF expendi-
tures from the EU budget, which are drawn from unspent ESF resources. This cap was initially 
set at €500 million for the 2007-13 budgetary cycle, but was reduced to €150 million for 2014-
20 because annual expenditures never reached more than this amount during the previous 
period (see section 3). 
In terms of procedures, to start an application, interested parties (regions, individuals, 
employers or representative organisations) should contact their EGF national coordinators. 
Given that the design and implementation of the programme is done at national level, poten-
tial applications are first screened by the member states. To be eligible for EGF financing, 
applications need to fulfil three basic requirements. 
First, applicants must show that the redundancies are the result of globalisation. In 2009, 
the scope of the EGF programme was enlarged to redundancies resulting from “the global 
financial and economic crisis”. When the EGF legislation was revised again in 2013, it was 
decided that during the 2014-20 budgetary period, the scope of the programme would con-
tinue to cover situations arising from the “continuation of the global financial and economic 
crisis […] or as a result of a new global financial and economic crisis”.
Second, individual applications must concern a fairly large minimum number of work-
ers. The original number was 1,000 redundancies in a particular (large) firm or in a group of 
smaller companies located in one or two contiguous regions. The threshold was reduced to 
500 in 2009 and has been kept at that level since. Although both the original and the subse-
quent legislation allow for a lower minimum number in exceptional cases, the fairly large 
number of redundancies required to qualify for the programme suggests that political visibil-
ity, though not a stated objective, is an obvious goal of the EGF.
Third, EGF applications must be intended to finance active labour market measures to 
re-train and re-employ redundant workers. Such financing is obviously subject to a time limit. 
Originally, the implementation period for the measures covered by a successful application 
was 12 months. The period was extended in 2009 and has remained at 24 months since. 
Applications must be submitted by interested parties to their national authorities, which 
must first verify that the eligibility criteria are met. Within 12 weeks of the announcement of 
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the redundancies, national authorities must submit the application to the European Commis-
sion, which has then two weeks to respond to the national authorities, typically requesting 
additional information that the national authorities must provide within six to eight weeks. 
The Commission then has 12 weeks to make a final determination of whether the application 
meets the required criteria. Once approved by the Commission, the application is submitted 
to the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, which must give their approval to 
commit EGF expenditures on each individual case as the EGF is formally outside the MFF 
process. 
3 The EGF: facts and figures 
Two data sources are available to describe the functioning of the EGF since its creation: the 
list of EGF applications made available by the European Commission’s employment, social 
affairs and inclusion directorate-general (DG EMPL), and the biennial reports2 presented 
by the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council describing the 
activities and accomplishments of the EGF. 
DG EMPL uploads regularly on its website the list of EGF applications, which provide 
case-level data on the sector of the company applying, the application date, intervention 
criteria, budgeted national and EGF contributions and the number of targeted workers. This 
is available for all applications (accepted, withdrawn, rejected) from 2007 to 2016. 
The Commission’s biennial reports include additional case-level information on 
completed programmes for which the Commission has received a final case report from 
national authorities (which they are required to file with the Commission six months after 
the completion of each EGF-financed programme3). The latest Commission report at time 
of writing was presented in October 2017. These reports give information on the charac-
teristics of targeted workers (age, gender), the number of workers actually helped, actual 
amounts spent and number of workers re-integrated into the labour force at the end of the 
implementation period. The most recent cases examined in the latest report date from 2014. 
This means that for the more recent cases, the only information available is the information 
on budgeted values and targeted workers contained in the list of applications provided by 
DG EMPL. 
Between 1 January 2007 and 31 December 2016, 147 applications to the EGF, covering 
140,545 redundant workers, were approved. This represents an average of about 15 applica-
tions and 15,000 workers per year, ie one thousand workers per application. Only 16 of the 
147 applications concerned situations with fewer than 500 redundancies. 
The total number of redundant workers who actually benefitted from EGF financing was 
91,505, but this figure only applies to the period 2007-14 (for which data on actual financing 
is available at the time of writing), during which 113,904 redundant workers were approved 
as eligible for EGF financing. The difference between eligible workers and actual beneficiar-
ies reflects the fact that about 20 percent of the eligible workers had already found a new job 
by the time their EGF application was funded.   
Although originally designed to deal with the consequences of globalisation, the EGF 
has actually been used more often to deal with redundancies caused by the economic and 
2   This report switched from annual to biennial in 2014. See European Commission (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2012, 2013, 2014 and 2016).
3   The publication of these reports, which could be useful to assess the EGF, is not mandatory and only a few member 
states publish them (see for instance Ireland: http://egf.ie/final-reports-for-completed-egf-programmes/). Thus, 
we do not have access to most of them.
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financial crisis: 52 percent of cases, covering 51 percent of the redundant workers and 
awarded 55 percent of the funding related to crisis fallout rather than globalisation. Table 1 
shows how EGF cases are distributed both in terms of justification (globalisation or crisis) 
and in terms of type of firm concerned (redundancies in a single large firm or in a group of 
small and medium sized companies, SMEs).
Table 1: Distribution of EGF cases, 2007-16
Number Percentage
Total EGF cases  147  
Number of SMEs cases 68 46%
of which globalisation  24 35%
of which crisis  44 65%
Number of single-firm cases 79 54%
of which globalisation  46 58%
of which crisis 33 42%
Source: European Commission (2018).
Figure 1 gives the total number of targeted redundant workers and the total funding 
committed under the EGF, broken down between ‘globalisation’ and ‘crisis’ for each year from 
2007 to 2016. Several points should be noted. First, the number of targeted workers made 
redundant because of globalisation has ranged between about 3,000 and 13,000 per year 
and their EGF funding has been between €14 million and €52 million per year. Second, the 
number of workers made redundant as a consequence of the crisis has ranged between zero 
and 24,000 per year and their EGF funding has been between zero and €115 million. Third, 
the maximum amount of funding awarded by the EGF in any year was €132 million in 2010, 
when €115 million was associated with the crisis and only €17 million with globalisation, 
which explains why the annual EGF envelope was lowered from €500 million to €150 million 
in 2013. Finally, the average amount of EGF funding awarded per worker over the period 
2007-16 was €4,219. Given that over the period, the average share of co-financing provided by 
member states was 42 percent, it means that each redundant worker eligible under the EGF 
received on average €7,274 in active labour market services.   
Figure 1: Number of targeted workers and total amount committed by the EGF, by 
year and justification, 2007-16
Source: European Commission (2018).
Figure 2 shows how the total number of redundant workers and the total funding 
committed under the EGF from 2007-16 was distributed to EU countries. Ten countries 
(Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and 
Spain) accounted for respectively 83 percent of all the redundant workers and 87 percent 
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of all the funding under the EGF programme. Second, among the main users, there were 
substantial differences in the reason for seeking help from the EGF: for some countries the 
main reason was globalisation (Belgium, Finland and Germany), for others it was the crisis 
(Greece, Ireland and Netherlands) and for the rest (Denmark, France, Italy and Spain), it was 
a combination of globalisation and the crisis. Third, central and eastern European countries 
benefitted little or not at all from the programme, presumably because they lost few jobs 
because of their relatively sustained growth over the period. Finally, the United Kingdom, 
though presumably as much affected by globalisation and the crisis as other countries in 
western Europe, did not use the programme at all. This was the result of a deliberate decision 
by the national authorities4.
Figure 2: Number of workers targeted and total amount committed by the ESF by 
country, 2007-16
Source:  European Commission (2018).
4   The UK is the only country in the EU without a national coordinator for the EGF and the British government made 
it clear that it was not interested in participating to the EGF and did not want the EU programme to be renewed. 
See for instance in 2012: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmeuleg/86-xvi/8605.htm. 
Moreover, we find in the ERM database (see next section) that at least six UK cases of extra-EU offshoring could 
have been eligible to EGF funding between 2007 and 2016.
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4 The EGF: an assessment
A proper evaluation of the programme requires answers to three main questions. First, if the 
EGF is above all a political tool, it needs to be visible. Has this been the case? Second, even if 
the EGF is mainly political, it also needs to be sensible from an economic perspective, raising 
the questions: what proportion of workers who became redundant in the EU during the pe-
riod 2007-16 as a consequence of globalisation received helped from the EGF? And how well 
did the workers helped by the EGF do in regaining employment, compared to workers with 
similar characteristics who lost their jobs for similar reasons but did not receive EGF help?
From a political perspective, the visibility of EGF cases is essential. To evaluate their 
visibility, we use the European Restructuring Monitor (ERM) database, which provides data 
on large-scale restructuring events reported by the media since 2003. The database covers 
restructuring events affecting at least 100 jobs or 10 percent of the workforce at worksites with 
more than 250 employees. It should therefore contain information on all the single-firm EGF 
cases, since they involve at least 500 redundancies. For each restructuring event, the ERM 
database provides information on the name of the affected company, its size, location and 
sector, and the type of restructuring and number of jobs lost. The ERM database covers 15,465 
events for the period 2007-16. All EGF cases, except for one single-firm EGF globalisation 
case, are included in ERM database, which suggests that single-firm EGF cases are, in most 
cases, highly visible.
In terms of whether the EGF programme has played a significant role in helping EU 
workers made redundant by globalisation, there is no existing data for the number of such 
workers. Lawrence (2014) suggests that five percent of job losses in the United States might be 
a consequence of globalisation. Assuming a similar proportion applies to the EU would imply 
that roughly 180,000 jobs are lost annually in the EU because of globalisation. How does that 
compare to the number of workers helped by the EGF? We found (section 3) that on average 
for the period 2007-16, 14,054 workers qualified for EGF assistance, of which only 48 percent 
lost their jobs as a consequence of globalisation. Therefore, a little below 7,000 workers made 
redundant by globalisation received EGF assistance each year, amounting to roughly four 
percent of the total of job losses ascribed to globalisation. 
An alternative approach would to use the ERM database and to focus on redundancies 
reported in the media that involve at least 100 workers or 10 percent of the workforce at 
worksites with more than 250 employees. Unfortunately, it is generally not possible in this 
database to distinguish whether restructurings are the result of globalisation or other causes, 
unless restructurings involve offshoring, for which the ERM database distinguishes between 
intra- and extra-EU offshoring. The ERM database includes 30 cases for the period 2007-16 
linked to extra-EU offshoring and involving at least 500 layoffs – meaning they were in princi-
ple eligible for EGF funding. However, EGF financing was received in only four of these cases. 
This suggests that only a small proportion of redundancies arising from globalisation – even 
among large, politically visible firms that received media attention – received EGF support.
Table 2: Offshoring events reported in the ERM database and EGF cases included 
  500 or more redundancies
Between 100 and 500 
redundancies
Intra-EU 19 (3) 203 (5)
Extra-EU 30 (4) 152 (3)
Various locations 19 (3) 80 (0)
Total 68 (of which 10 EGF cases) 435 (of which 8 EGF cases)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurofound, European Restructuring Monitor (ERM) (available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/
emcc/erm/factsheets) and European Commission (2018). Note: EGF cases included in parenthesis. There were eight EGF cases which, 
when matched with the ERM database, are labelled as ‘intra-EU offshoring’. These eight cases were submitted to the EGF on the grounds of 
a serious shift in EU trade in goods or services rather than the offshoring of activities to third countries.
Only a small 
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The question is therefore why the number of workers qualifying for EGF assistance is so 
small compared to the estimated number of workers losing their jobs because of globali-
sation, and why cases that could have been eligible for EGF assistance were not included. 
Beyond the fact that the amount of money available for the EGF programme is fairly small 
(which has not in itself been an issue given that the cap has never been reached since the cre-
ation of the EGF), a survey of national authorities in charge of the EGF programmes by Puccio 
(2017) indicates several potential reasons for its under-use and also its uneven deployment in 
different EU countries:
• Eligibility criteria might be too strict. First, the minimum threshold for the number of 
workers affected might be too high, especially for small countries or those where affect-
ed workers are mainly in SMEs. Second, the scope of the EGF might be too narrow: it 
excludes, for instance, redundancies generated by intra-EU trade and offshoring (while 
single market policies are also an EU exclusive competence).
• Administrative rules might be too complex and result in lengthy procedures, which might 
discourage applications.
• The level of co-funding by national authorities might be too high, especially compared 
to other EU funds. In particular, ESF-financed programmes provide between 50 percent 
and 85 percent (95 percent in exceptional cases) of total project costs depending on the 
relative wealth of the region5. Some central and eastern European countries might opt for 
the ESF – even for redundancies that might be generated by globalisation – over the EGF, 
which offers a lower co-funding rate.
Finally, we examine the effectiveness of the EGF in helping dismissed workers find 
new jobs. The available data indicates that the average re-employment rate of workers who 
received EGF assistance is 46 percent by the end of the implementation period (two years 
since the revision of the EGF rules in 2009). However, it is important to note great variability, 
with re-employment rates ranging on average between 26 percent in Belgium and 92 percent 
in the Czech Republic (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3: EGF re-employment rate, 2007-14
Source: European Commission reports to the European Parliament and the Council (2008 to 2016). Note: the EGF re-employment rate is 
calculated as the number of workers re-integrated into the labour market at the end of the EGF-financed programmes divided by the total 
number of beneficiaries. This data is available for 121 cases from 2007 to 2014. The average share of re-integrated workers 1 year after 
EGF implementation is based on 67 cases from 2007 to 2011, as reported by the ex-post evaluation of the EGF (Andrews et al, 2015).
5   See ESF guidelines: http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=525.
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The average re-employment rate of 46 percent means that, overall, only two-fifths of the 
workers eligible for EGF financing found a job within two years thanks to this financing. 
As discussed earlier, one-fifth had already found a job before the financing started and the 
remaining two-fifths had not yet found a job at the end of the two-year EGF implementa-
tion period. 
We cannot assess, however, if the 46 percent average re-employment rate can be consid-
ered satisfactory, because (1) we do not have data for individual workers who received EGF 
assistance (but only for the average worker in individual EGF cases); and (2) even if we did, 
we could not compare EGF-assisted workers with equivalent dismissed workers available in 
data from Eurostat’s European Labour Force Survey (ELFS) or EU Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC), because these two data sources provide information neither 
on the reason for dismissal nor on re-employment rates within a two-year period.       
5 Conclusions and recommendations to  
 improve the EGF
Overall, the idea behind the EGF – to help correct the negative side-effects of globalisation 
with active labour market policies and to be seen to do so – was certainly valid in principle 
because globalisation creates losers as well as winners. 
Politically, it was important for the EU to create a budgetary instrument that would enable 
it to assume some financial responsibility – even if relatively modest – for assisting workers 
displaced by trade liberalisation, considering EU trade policy is an exclusive EU compe-
tence. Amounts devoted to EGF programmes are necessarily very limited compared to those 
involved in member states’ labour market policies, and in their education policies, which are 
also essential for coping with the labour market changes induced by globalisation. It is impor-
tant therefore that the philosophy of the EGF programme, which is to give national author-
ities a small but targeted financial incentive to put in place or improve active labour market 
measures to assist displaced workers, rather than simply provide them with unemployment 
benefits, should be translated into effective measures. 
Visibility of the EGF programme is an objective that matters and that seems to have been 
met, at least to some extent. But it is also essential that EGF money be well spent and that 
services financed by the EGF really do make it more likely beneficiaries will find another job. 
Unfortunately, the available data does not allow an assessment of the effectiveness of the 
programme in this respect. We were struck by the fact that more than 50 percent of the cases 
that benefitted from EGF assistance and more than 50 percent of the money spent, involved 
workers made redundant by the economic and financial crisis, rather than by globalisation 
per se. This suggests that there might have been significant administrative constraints in the 
operation of the programme for trade adjustment assistance, which were partly lifted to assist 
workers hit by the crisis. 
We make three recommendations to improve the EGF programme in the context of the 
next MFF, some of which partly overlap with recommendations already made by Cernat and 
Mustilli (2017): 
1. There is a need to improve the monitoring and evaluation of the programme by collecting 
more and better data. The present situation is clearly unsatisfactory because it does not 
allow a proper scientific evaluation of the EGF. The best approach would be to collect data 
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at the individual level and not only at the case level6. This would allow evaluators of the EGF 
to use quasi-experimental methods by building a relevant control group that is similar to the 
treatment group (based on age, gender, education, experience, marital status, other unem-
ployment services received, etc). At the very least, final case reports should be made available 
and should be standardised in terms of measures undertaken and outcomes. This would have 
the additional advantage of making cases comparable so that member states can share good 
practices. It would also give some needed visibility to the EGF.
2. There is a need to revise the administration of the programme to increase its use. There are 
too many constraints on eligibility. First, one should envisage having no threshold (like the 
TAA) or at least a much lower threshold than currently. Obviously, this would imply that the 
amount of money needed for the programme could increase significantly7, but it would also 
mean greater equity in the allocation of funds between workers who work in large establish-
ments, who tend to be eligible, and those working in relatively small companies who tend to 
be excluded, unless they are geographically concentrated. Second, the co-funding rate could 
be changed. The new rate should the same as the co-funding rate for ESF programmes (and 
thus be different for different regions, depending on their relative income levels) in order to 
avoid any disincentive to use the EGF, in particular in central and eastern European countries, 
where the national co-funding rate for the EGF is higher than for the ESF. Third, the European 
Commission could be more proactive in its management of the EGF. It could for instance use 
the ERM database to detect redundancy plans that meet the EGF eligibility criteria and suggest 
to national authorities that they could apply and put in place EGF programmes for these cases. 
3. Finally, one should consider enlarging the scope of assistance for adjustment from globalisa-
tion to other policy-induced sources of adjustment, including intra-EU trade and offshoring, 
and the phasing out of activities in order to reduce carbon emissions (Tagliapetra, 2017). The 
ERM database suggests that increasing the scope to intra-EU offshoring and reducing the 
threshold to 100 redundancies, could result in several hundred additional EGF cases (see 
Table 2)8. The EGF could therefore become the EAF, the European Adjustment Fund, with 
expanded resources. Ideally these resources should be included in the MFF through the 
creation of a specific budget line (which would also have the advantage of speeding up the 
procedure). The additional resources for the European Adjustment Fund should come from 
the budget currently allocated to the European Social Fund.
6   Collecting data at the individual level in order to be able to undertake scientific ex-post evaluation was recommended 
by Wasmer and von Weizsäcker (2007) when the programme was launched.
7   Coming back to our back-of-the-envelope calculation, if all 180,000 workers affected by globalisation were covered, this 
would represent a total budget for EGF-financed programmes of €800 million per year (assuming expenditure equal to 
the average amount spent in the period 2007-16, ie about €4200/beneficiary).
8   Reducing the threshold to 100 redundancies would also result in an additional 150 extra-EU cases.
There is a need 
to revise the 
administration of 
the EGF to increase 
its use. There are too 
many constraints on 
eligibility.
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